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Introduction
The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed the eruption of Islam into the 
political landscape of the Indonesian nation-state. Signs of this reassertion of political 
Islam might be seen in a variety of social movements that utilize Islam as a discursive 
center, ranging from the establishment of Islamic political parties to mounting demands 
for the implementation of the Islamic short a, Muslim jurisprudence. More dramatically, 
the resurfacing of political Islam on the recent political scene of Indonesia, after the 
outbreak of a multidimensional socio-political and economic crisis, has been 
demonstrated by the emergence of a number of Muslim paramilitary groups, 
characterized by their distinctive appearance: wearing certain uniforms and carrying 
different kinds of weapons. Exploiting religious symbols, they behave as if they are 
military men and have conducted a variety of radical actions in the public sphere. This 
phenomenon undoubtedly spreads a sort of privatized militancy and violence.
Amongst a dozen such Muslim paramilitary groups, three major groups have 
recently come to the fore and made headlines by taking to the streets to demand the 
implementation of the Islamic short a, conducting razzias at cafes, discotheques, and 
casinos, and, most importantly, sending thousands of militia troops to the Moluccan 
islands. These three major active groups are the Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Paramilitary 
Force), the Laskar Pembela Islam (the Paramilitary Force of the Defender of Islam),
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and the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Holy Warrior Paramilitary Force). 
They have complemented and facilitated the development of similar militant youth 
groups organized by a number of political parties, mass organizations, and the ruling 
regime. Among these groups are the Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), the Barisan 
Pemuda Ka'bah (Ka'ba Youth Squad), the Satgas PDIP (Task Force of Indonesian 
Democratic Party-Struggle), the Banser Anshor (Anshor Assistance Unit for All 
Purposes), the Pamswakarsa (Self-Service Security Force), the Pendekar Banten 
(Banten Warriors), the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Muslim Youth Movement), the Front 
Hizbullah (God's Army Front), and the Front Pemuda Islam (The Front of Muslim 
Youth).
The sudden proliferation of these Muslim paramilitary groups has certainly 
attracted the notice of many observers at home and abroad. Many of them speculate, 
without any attempt to give a critical assessment, that this proliferation is due simply 
to the attempts of some military and civilian personalities to mobilize certain groups in 
the society for their own political causes. Such speculation is certainly not sufficient to 
explain the complexity of this phenomenon, particularly since religion and politics are 
likely interwoven in it. It seems imperative, then, to present an analysis of these Muslim 
paramilitary groups in a broader framework, combining historical, theological, 
sociological, and political approaches.
This paper will focus primarily on the Laskar Jihad, the most ambitious and radical 
manifestation of political Islam in Indonesia today. In this paper, I shall explore the 
process of the creation of this particular Muslim paramilitary group and the backdrop 
of its emergence in the context of the major changes taking place in the socio-political 
and economic realms in Indonesia after the crackdown following the multidimensional 
crisis.
The Laskar Jihad and Sim ilar Groups
The Laskar Jihad might be considered the most exclusive Muslim paramilitary 
group that emerged after the collapse of the New Order regime. It consists of around 
ten thousand young members, militants who prefer to wear jalabiyya, long flowing 
robes, and long beards. This group has also been the most active in sending voluntary 
militias to the Moluccan islands. It has emerged on the scene as an undoubtedly 
militant Islamic group, overwhelming much of the country through the onward march of 
its members willing to martyr themselves for the cause of God.
The Laskar Jihad is a paramilitary division of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah 
wal-Jama'ah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community 
of the Prophet),2 or, in short, FKAWJ, an organization which is, in fact, not supported
2 The doctrine of this group is not to be confused with the doctrine ahl al-sunrm wa al-jama'a developed by 
the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), the biggest organization of traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia. Among NU 
members, the doctrine simply means Sunni Islam, which strictly follows one of the four orthodox schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence; see M. Ali Haidar, Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam 
Politik (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1998), p. 316; see also Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, 
Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacom Baru (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994), p. 21. The NU leader, Hasyim 
Muzadi, has questioned the use of this term by the Laskar Jihad members, and highlighted that the NU's 
doctrine ahl al-sunm wa al-jama'a should not be confused with that of the Laskar Jihad.
Faith and Politics: Laskar Jihad 147
by mainstream Indonesian Islam. The FKAWJ was established by Ja'far Umar Thalib, 
and officially inaugurated at a tabligh akbar, a mass religious meeting, in Solo, Central 
Java, on February 14, 1998. Even before its official foundation, the FKAWJ was 
already in existence. It had its beginnings in the development of the Jama'ah Ihya al- 
Sunnah (The Community of the Revival of the Sunna), which was basically an exclusive 
dcTwa (propagation of Islam) movement, insisting on the correct implementation of 
Islamic sharta. Even though we cannot deny some parallels with the major Islamist 
movements in the Muslim world during the twentieth century, particularly the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Jam a'at-i Island, the Ihya al-Sunnah community was more 
significantly influenced by Wahhabism, an official school of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it 
was part of the so-called Salafi society, adopting the most puritanical Saudi style of 
Islam. This Salafi society began to proliferate in Indonesia in the beginning of the 1990s, 
particularly after the return of young graduates from Islamic universities in the Middle 
East.3
Wahhabism was a major revivalist movement initiated by Muhammad ibn “ Abd al- 
Wahhab (1703-1787), who drew inspiration from the teachings of Ahmad ibn 
Taymiyyah (1263-1328), a medieval scholar of Hanbalism, the strictest of the four 
legal schools of Sunni Islam. Assisted by a local prince, Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, this 
movement gained a considerable success in the Arabian Peninsula. With their 
puritanical spirit, the Wahhabis set out to fight against the superstitions prevalent in 
Arabian society and to attack those who claimed to be Muslim but whose behavior 
was, in their view, un-Islamic. They took a hard line in defining who could be regarded 
as a believer, stating that no deviation from the short a was permitted, and they drew a 
firm distinction between the world of believers and that of unbelievers.4 By drawing 
their inspiration more significantly from Wahhabism, the Salafi society distinguished 
itself from earlier Indonesian Muslim organizations by its strict adherence to an 
extreme puritanism, manifested in their appearance and in the enforcement of religious 
observance.
The Laskar Jihad began to catch the public eye when they held a tabligh akbar at the 
Senayan main stadium in Jakarta at the beginning of April 2000. Attended by about 
100,000 participants, this tabligh akbar decried the "disaster" that had been afflicting 
the Moluccan Muslims, who were perceived to be confronted by a genocidal threat. 
Seeking to counteract the threat, Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of this group, 
proclaimed the necessity of raising the banner of jihad, which, for this leader, means 
armed holy battle.5 Openly, he stated the determination of his members to go to the 
battlefield in the Moluccan islands and to stand with the Moluccan Muslims fighting 
against their Christian enemies. Subsequently, he established a paramilitary training 
camp in Bogor, a region near Jakarta, to train thousands of young men declaring 
themselves prepared to engage in combat in a number of troubled spots in Indonesia.
3 Besides the Ihya al-Sunnah, this society includes, to mention but a few, the Ihya al-Turath community, the 
Al-Sofwa, and the As-Sunna foundation, with branches and schools scattered all over Indonesia.
4 John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modem World, 2nd edition (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1994), pp. 53-56.
5 In fact, the term jihad has a spectrum of meanings, including struggle against one's own innermost selfish 
tendencies; for a detailed explication of this term, see, for instance, Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: 
The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989), p. 217.
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After this tabligh akbar, the Laskar Jihad marched to the presidential palace. They 
demanded that the government restore social order and curb the ethno-religious conflict 
in the Moluccas. Six representatives of the Laskar Jihad met President Abdurrahman 
Wahid. They were Ja'far Umar Thalib, Ayif Syafruddin, Brigadier General (ret.) 
Rustam Kastor, Ah Fauzi, Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari, and Tasrif Tuasikal. They 
accused the president of favoring Christians in the Moluccas and of having led his 
country into the trap set by either a West-cum-Zionist conspiracy or, alternatively, a 
communist plot, as indicated by the escalation of the conflict occurring in the islands. 
The meeting came to an abrupt end after Wahid had them thrown out of his office.6
Following the first massive demonstration, the Laskar Jihad decided to do 
something concrete and sent their first mission, an investigation team, to the Moluccas. 
This team was charged with a special duty, namely to survey and carefully map the 
areas of conflict and the latest position of Muslims in the islands. Even though the 
political and military leaders in Jakarta forced them to cancel this mission, the 
members of the team eventually succeeded in landing in Ambon. At the port of the 
island, one member of this mission recounted, they were enthusiastically welcomed by 
some military men, who greeted them by saying, "Welcome to the jihad battlefield," 
and they were immediately provided with a number of standard military weapons, 
including AK-47s and SS-14s.7 The success of this mission apparently convinced the 
Laskar Jihad that their struggle to rescue their Muslim brothers in the Moluccas should 
be continued. Fired by jihad fervor, waves of Laskar Jihad fighters have left for the 
Moluccan islands.
While the Laskar Jihad was very much concerned with what they called the jihad 
action in the Moluccas, the Laskar Pembela Islam preferred to focus on sweeping 
actions against cafes, discotheques, casinos, and other venues they accused of being 
dens of iniquity. Despite their similarities, the latter group is different from the former, 
particularly in terms of their origins and institutional profiles. The Laskar Pembela 
Islam is, to a large extent, not founded on as firm an ideological and organizational 
basis as the Laskar Jihad. It is the paramilitary division of the Front Pembela Islam (the 
Front of the Defenders of Islam, FPI), which is often associated with a number of 
military and civilian personalities who are not ashamed to mobilize preman, gangsters, 
and other violence-prone groups in order to maintain their political interests. This 
group is led by Habib Rizieq Shihab (b. 1965), a young Arab from a family of sayyids, 
descendants of the Prophet. Habib Rizieq Shihab studied at King Muhammad ibn Saud 
University in Riyad under the sponsorship of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), a forum for political and economic cooperation between Muslim 
countries established in 1962.8 A number of other leading figures among the sayyid 
families are also involved in the leadership of the Front Pembela Islam, including Habib
6 This event was reported by various mass media. See, for instance, "Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu 
Presiden," Kompns, April 7, 2000.
7 Interview with a member of the team, Cempaka Putih Tengah, Jakarta, December 2000.
8 See Hasan Moinuddin, Die Organisation der Islamischen Konferenz als Forum Politischer und 
Wirtschaftlicher Kooperation (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1984), pp. 170-176.
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Husein al-Habsyi (b. 1955), the leader of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood,9 who 
served ten years of a twenty-year prison sentence for his activities associated with the 
bombing of the Borobudur stupa in 1985.
The Laskar Pembela Islam first made its presence felt in a massive demonstration 
on August 17, 1998, where it publicly challenged the different elements that had 
opposed B. J. Habibie as the president to succeed Suharto. This group emerged at a 
time when the Pamswakarsa, the Front Hizbullah, and the Gerakan Pemuda Islam 
began to be more vocal in their support for Habibie. These groups were initially formed 
by Suharto's supporters in response to the growing opposition to the former president. 
After their initial appearance, the Laskar Pembela Islam held earnest demonstrations 
to voice a variety of demands related to Islam, repeating the slogan al-amr bi al-ma' ruf 
wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil). On one occasion, the 
members of the Laskar Pembela Islam attacked the Komisi Nasional Hak A zazi 
Manusia (National Commission of Human Rights, KOMNAS-HAM), condemning them 
for acting unfairly towards Muslims. At that time, the commission was occupied with 
an investigation concerning the past actions of certain army generals, particularly the 
then-minister of defense, Wiranto, who was suspected of having violated human rights 
during military operations in East Timor.10
Similarly, thousands of members of the Laskar Pembela Islam marched to the 
headquarters of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People's Consultative 
Assembly) during its session in August 2000, demanding that the MPR enforce the 
Jakarta Charter, once intended to be the preamble to the constitution. In this document, 
a statement "with the obligation to carry out the Islamic sharTa for its adherents" was 
added to the first principle (Belief in God) of the Pancasila, the ideology of the state, 
which would have given constitutional status to the sharT a. It is worth noting that the 
debate on the Jakarta Charter can be traced back to the 1950s, when the Majelis 
Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) considered the proposal of Muslim parties to 
establish Islam as the foundation of the state in place of the Pancasila; the debate 
continued until the dissolution of the Majelis Konstituante in 1959.11 For the Laskar 
Pembela Islam, the implementation of the Jakarta Charter would lead to the 
revitalization of the supremacy of the sharT a.
The revitalization of supremacy of the Islamic sharT a also constitutes the main 
theme voiced by the members of the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia. This group is a loose 
alliance of a number of minor Muslim paramilitary groups and Muslim hard-line 
organizations scattered across various cities in Indonesia, where the Darul Islam 
rebellions had their roots. Included in the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia are, to mention 
but a few organizations, the Laskar Santri (Muslim Student Paramilitary Force), the 
Laskar Jundullah (God's Army Paramilitary Force), the Kompi Badr (Badr Company), 
the Brigade Taliban (Taliban Brigade), and the Pasukan Komando Mujahidin 
(Mujahidin Command Force).
9 The establishment of this organization, allegedly an Indonesian branch of the originally Egyptian 
religious-political movement of this name, was made public on October 17,1999, though it had existed as an 
underground political movement for several years.
10 See "Habib di Panggung Politik," Gatra 08/VI (January 8,2000).
11 See B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971).
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Organizationally, the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia is under the umbrella of the 
M ajelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly), established as the 
result of the so-called "first national congress of mujahidin," which took place in 
Yogyakarta in 2000. This congress, indirectly supported by a number of Islamic 
organizations and political parties from the modernist end of the spectrum, discussed 
one central theme: the enforcement of the sharta as absolutely necessary to curb the 
various problems and disasters afflicting contemporary Indonesia. Within the context 
of the implementation of the shart a, the notions of khildfa Islamiyya (Islamic caliphate), 
imama (imamate), and jihad (holy war) were also discussed.12
The congress opened on August 5, 2000 and ended on August 7 with the 
establishment of the M ajelis Mujahidin Indonesia by the participants. It seems to me 
that this date was not accidental. On the same date fifty-one years earlier, S. M. 
Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia), 
pursuing an independent Islamic state within Indonesia.13 This so-called Darul Islam 
rebellion inspired the clandestine Negara Islam Indonesia (Nil) movement, which first 
manifested itself in 1978 when a group using the name Usrah, literally meaning 
"fam ily," was formed in Bandung. The movement spread into various cities; in the 
process, it was often identified by different names, such as the Jama'ah Islamiyah in 
Solo, the Generasi 554 in Jakarta, and the N il Cirebon in Cirebon.14
A number of leading personalities, including Deliar Noer, Mochtar Naim, Mawardi 
Noor, Ah Yafie, Alawi Muhammad, Ahmad Syahirul Alim, and A. M. Saefuddin, some 
of whom are also former members of Masyumi, were appointed as members of the so- 
called ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd—literally "those who have the power to bind and 
unbind"—a kind of supreme body in the organization which resembles an advisory 
council.15 This body is led by Abu Bakar Ba'ashir, the leader of the Ngruki Pesantren, a 
conservative Islamic boarding school in Solo, who was arrested in November 1978 for 
his responsibility for allegedly leading the Jama'ah Islamiyah. Giving a speech at "the 
first national congress of mujahidin," he proclaimed that the application of Islam ic 
shart a was absolutely essential, and argued that its rejection must be countered by 
jihad.16 The congress itself was initiated by Irfan S. Awwas, now the chairman of the 
executive committee (lajna tanfidhiyya) of the assembly. He was the editor-in-chief of 
the banned magazine Arrisalah in Yogyakarta, and served nine years of a thirteen-year 
prison sentence for his activities associated with the Negara Islam Indonesia 
movement.
12 Irfan S. Awwas, ed., Risalah Kongres Mujahidin 1 dan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam (Yogyakarta: Wihdah 
Press, 2001).
13 See C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1981), p. 1.
14 See June Chandra Santosa, Modernization, Utopia, and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia (PhD 
dissertation, Boston University, 1996), appendix 3.
15 The concept of ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd is closely related to the concept shura (consultation), which is, in 
modem Islamist literature, usually interpreted as the basic element of democracy. The concept denies the 
legitimacy of authoritarian rule and makes the community the source of executive power. See, for instance, 
Ahmad S. Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, 
and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), p. 121.
16 Awwas, Risalah Kongres Mujahidin, p. 139.
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The emergence of these Muslim paramilitary civilian groups leads to some 
fundamental questions, particularly in relation to the process of how they came into 
existence. In order to deal with this issue, I will focus on the Laskar Jihad in my 
analysis. It is a good example of a group that has arisen as a consequence of 
interrelated developments at both the domestic and the international levels. In 
addition, this group best exemplifies the combination of different factors, both religious 
and political, in forging its activism and militancy.
Biographical Sketch of the Leader of the Laskar Jihad
The establishment and growth of the Laskar Jihad has been determined to a great 
extent by the role of their charismatic and millenarian leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib. A 
central figure among the Laskar Jihad voluntary fighters, he was active not only in 
setting up this Muslim paramilitary group, but also in defining its direction and 
activism. He was bom into an Arab family in Malang, East Java, on December 29, 
1961. His father was active in the al-Irshad movement, a reformist organization 
established in 1913 by Arabs living in the Netherlands East Indies, who were involved 
in a conflict with the sayyid community. Together with the Muhammadiyah and the 
Persatuan Islam (Islamic League),17 the al-Irshad, under the leadership of Ahmad 
Soorkatti (1872-1943), strove to purify Indonesian Muslims of the so-called tahayyul 
(superstitions), bid'a (innovations), and khurafa (deviations) in their religious belief.18
Ja'far Umar Thalib completed his early education at his native town, Malang. After 
having finished secondary school at the Islamic Teacher Training School of Malang, he 
continued his studies at a pesantren of the Persatuan Islam in Bangil, East Java, in 1981. 
Disappointed with the pesantren, he went to Jakarta to continue his studies at the 
Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA), an institute of higher learning 
sponsored by the Saudi Arabian government. While at the LIPIA, he was not only 
active in learning Arabic, but also became a leader of the student organization of the 
al-Irshad, which strongly opposed the Pancasila.
Ja'far Umar Thalib studied at the LIPIA for only three years, but in 1986 he had the 
opportunity to continue his study at the Maududi Islamic Institute in Pakistan. In the 
mid-1980s, many Indonesian students were given the opportunity to study in Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan under the sponsorship of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia 
(Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia, DDII). This project was considered crucial 
because it trained believers who were prepared to conduct da'wa activities in 
opposition to Christian missionaries. The Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia was 
established in 1967 by Muhammad Natsir (d. 1993), the former leader of Masyumi, 
who was obsessed with the idea that Islam was under siege primarily because of the 
expansion of Christian missionary projects.19 Through a personal relation of its leader,
17 The Muhammadiyah was founded by Ahmad Dahlan (1869-1923) in Yogyakarta in 1912, while the 
Persatuan Islam, known as the Persis, was founded by Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958) in Bandung in 1920.
18 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), pp. 63-85.
19 See R. William Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action 
in New Order Indonesia," in Towards a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, 
ed. Mark R. Woodward (Arizona: Arizona State University Press, 1996), pp. 328-329.
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the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia has become associated with the Rabitat al- 
'Alam  al-Islami (Muslim World League), functioning as its representative in Indonesia 
since 1973.20 The Rabita was one of the principal organizations used by Saudi Arabia 
in spreading Salafi-W ahhabi propaganda.21 The development of Salafi-W ahhabi 
propaganda, which urged followers to avoid issues of political power, began as an 
attempt by Saudi Arabia to protect its geo-strategic position, particularly against the 
challenges raised by secular Arab nationalism, which was being fueled by such leaders 
as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. This propaganda was extended and intensified in 
the 1980s after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, which contested the legitimacy of 
the kingdom.22 Within this context, the Rabita has played a central part in distributing 
Saudi monies, which fund the proliferation of the Sunni Salafi-W ahhabi networks 
throughout the Muslim world and in Western countries as well.23
Before going back to his country of origin, in 1987 Ja'far Umar Thalib had the 
opportunity to visit Afghanistan, where mujahidin were waging war against the Soviet 
Union. During the war, the Rabita, in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Arab Islamist organizations, played a crucial role in sending young mujahidin 
volunteers from the Middle East to engage in combat side-by-side with Afghan fighters. 
The policy of the Rabita, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Arab Islamist 
organizations was implemented by the Pakistani Jam a'at-i Islami,24 their principal local 
counterpart, which created camps for military training, where the young mujahidin 
volunteers trained before being sent to the front.25
There were a number of factions within the Afghan mujahidin that were known to 
have received not only Saudi Arabian financial aid, but were also provided with 
voluntary fighters.26 They were, for instance, the Ittihad-i Islami Bara-i Azadi-yi 
Afghanistan, led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the JamTat-i Islami, led by Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, and the Hizb-i Islami, led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Ja'far Umar Thalib 
initially joined one of these factions. Subsequently, however, he supported the Jam a'at 
al-D a'w a ila al-Qur'an wa Ahl-i Hadlth,27 a strict Salafi faction and Saudi 
"principality" led by Jamil al-Rahman, who applied the doctrine of takfir, requiring 
Muslims to excommunicate any sovereign considered apostate, and to resort to
20 On the link between the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia and the Rabita, see Reinhard Schulze, 
Islamischer Intemationalismus Im 20 Jahrhundert (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), p. 260.
21 See Barnett R. Rubin, "Arab Islamists in Afghanistan," in Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or 
Reform?, ed. John L. Esposito (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 185.
22 See Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1996), pp. 112-117; see also Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or 
Peaceful Coexistence? (Westport: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), pp. 155 ff.
23 An example is the Revival of Islamic Da'wa society, which is headquartered in Toronto, Canada. See the 
homepage of this group at http ://www.troid.org. This society was mentioned by the spokesman of the 
FKAWJ, when I asked him about the kitabs (guidebooks) and 'ulamas (guidelines) commonly referred to by 
the FKAWJ members.
24 On this political organization, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1994).
25 Rubin, "Arab Islamists in Afghanistan," pp. 184-186.
26 On the flow of Saudi arms and money to Afghanistan, see also Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Islam, Oil and the 
New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 85.
27 See "Profil Ja'far Umar Thalib: Pelopor Jihad ke Ambon," Forum Keadilan, No. 7 (May 20,2001), p. 37.
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violence, should it be necessary.28 This faction had special relations with the Pakistani 
Ahl-i Hadlth, a reformist movement founded in the Indian sub-continent in the 
nineteenth century. This movement was inspired by the teachings of Shah Wali Allah 
al-Dihlawi (1702-1762). Over the course of history, this movement transformed itself 
into a political party, enjoying direct support from Saudi Arabia (in collaboration with 
the United States) in its attempts to support Afghan mujahidin. For the same reason, a 
Salafi Ahl-i Hadith-based militant armed Islamic group, Da'wa al-Irshad or Lashkar 
Tayyiba, was even established in 1987 in Pakistan. This group inculcated the spirit of 
jihad and provided military training for potential mujahidin.29
In 1989, Ja'far Umar Thalib landed in Jakarta. Back in Indonesia, he was 
immediately involved in teaching activities in a pesantren of the al-Irshad in Salatiga, 
Central Java. In 1991, he went to Yemen in order to widen his insight into Wahhabiya 
teachings with a Yemeni teacher, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-W adi'i, known for his links with 
the conservative Islamist Islah party and the Saudi-funded Salafi-W ahhabi movement 
in Yemen today.30 During the hajj months, he repeatedly went to Mecca and Medina to 
perform the hajj. While performing the hajj, Ja'far Umar Thalib sought out and attended 
religious lectures held by a number of prominent Saudi Salafi-W ahhabi teachers, 
including Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and 'Abd al-'A ziz ' Abd Allah 
bin Baz (1912-1999). Bom in Albania, Nasr al-Din al-Albani had lived and studied for 
a long time in Damascus before moving to Saudi Arabia, where he became a well- 
known scholar of the prophetic tradition. He wrote some works on the validity of 
hadiths, including Silsila al-Ahadith al-Sahiha (The valid genealogy of the hadiths). 
Expertise in hadith linked Nasr al-Din al-Albani to 'Abd Allah bin Baz, who was 
known as the official grand mufti of Saudi Arabia. 'Abd Allah bin Baz had enjoyed a 
remarkable career as a university teacher and a judge before he became a grand mufti. 
His fatwas are collected in his greatest book, Majmu 'al-Fatawd (The compilation of 
fatwas). Some other Saudi Salafi-Wahhabi teachers were also visited by Ja'far Umar 
Thalib, particularly Rabi' ibn Hadi 'Umar al-Madkhali, a hadith lecturer at the Islamic 
University of Medina, who has written a number of works, including Manhaj al-Anbiya 
ft al-Da'wa ila Allah (The method of the prophets in calling towards Allah). This book 
contains guidelines for the practice of the Wahhabi da'wa.31
Ja'far Umar Thalib returned to Indonesia in 1993, choosing to live in Yogyakarta. In 
this city, he began to make his voice heard by giving religious lectures and sermons at 
the Muslim students' discussion groups, known as the kelompok pengajian or halaqah 
(literally, study circles), around university campuses in Yogyakarta. As a figure who
28 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, p. 36.
29 For further information about the Lashkar Tayyiba, see Saeed Shafqat, "Religious Groups: Rise of 
Dawat-ul-Irshad/Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Problem of Democratic Framework in Pakistan," 
unpublished paper presented in the seminar organized by Pakistan Study Groups, Paris on December 13, 
1999.
30 Look through http ://www.al-bab.com, for different subjects and articles. His name is also written as 
Sheikh Muqbil al-Wada'i. As for the connection between Yemeni Salafi and al-Islah, see Eric Watkins, 
"Islamism and Tribalism in Yemen," in Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and 
Anoushiravan Ehtshami (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 215-225; see also Paul Dresch 
and Bernard Haykel, "Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen," The 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995): 405-431.
31 Various interviews with the Laskar Jihad members, Yogyakarta and Jakarta, September-November 2000.
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had mastered a wide range of religious knowledge, Ja'far Umar Thalib quickly 
attracted numerous followers among the participants. In 1994, he decided to establish 
a pesantren and community called "Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah" at Kaliurang, Yogyakarta.
The Manhaj Salafi: Doctrine and Ideology of the Ihya al-Sunnah
As implied by its name, the Ihya al-Sunnah placed emphasis on the revitalization 
of Islam in all aspects of life through the practice of returning to the model of the Salaf 
al-Salih, the pious Muslims of the first generation. The backdrop of this call was its 
claim that Muslims, induced by a variety of temptations offered by the contemporary 
secular, Western world, have neglected true Islam as taught by the Salaf al-Salih. This 
abandonment, according to the Ihya al-Sunnah, has brought about the collapse of the 
glory of Islam. The Ihya al-Sunnah community was convinced that only by a return to 
the doctrine of the Salaf al- Salih would Muslims be able to steer away from deviations 
in their practice of the faith, and this would lead Muslims to regain their lost 
triumphs.32 Referred to by the Ihya al-Sunnah as either "Manhaj Salafi" (The system of 
the pious ancestors) or "Manhaj Ahl al-H adith" (The system of the followers of the 
Prophet's traditions), this doctrine undoubtedly represents the search for authenticity, 
which implies puritanical ideals, better known in Islam as Salafism.
As I have indicated before, unlike earlier Muslim modernist organizations in 
Indonesia, which were more significantly influenced by Muhammad 'Abduh (1849- 
1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), two premier Muslim reformists, the 
Ihya al-Sunnah was squarely within the puritanical Salafi-Wahhabi tradition. This can 
be seen, for instance, in the fact that among the members of the Ihya al-Sunnah 
community, the canonical books written by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Ahmad 
Ibn Taymiyyah, and Muhammad Abu Bakr ibn Qayyim, the disciple of Ibn Taymiyyah, 
were widely read as guidelines to understanding and defining Islam. In their books, the 
Qur'an and the Sunna are given particular emphasis as the basis for the Wahhabi 
definition of true Islam.
True to their advocacy of the espousal of the return to the doctrine of the Salaf al- 
Salih according to the Saudi Wahhabi model, the Ihya al-Sunnah community avoided 
discussing politics, or, more precisely, engaging questions of political power. Instead, 
they concentrated on re-Islamizing society at a grassroots level by insisting on the 
correct implementation of the short a by individuals, particularly through preaching and 
the establishment of Islamized spaces. Within this context, the Ihya al-Sunnah 
members persistently encouraged people to go to mosques to perform prayers 
collectively five times a day and persuaded them to join the Ihya al-Sunnah 
community. In addition to that, the Ihya al-Sunnah members have attempted to 
develop an exclusive pattern of performance, clothing, and social relations, which they 
claimed were modeled on patterns followed by Salaf al-Salih. They have preferred, for 
instance, to adopt traditional clothing—a long white shirt, baggy trousers gathered
32 See editorial notes of the first edition of the journal Salafy, published by the Ihya al-Sunnah (Salafy 1, 
1995), p. 1.
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above the ankle, and headgear—and allowed their beards to grow long.33 They also 
rejected all distractions: music, theater, and places of pleasure and entertainment, such 
as cafes, discotheques, and dance clubs.34 Perfume, the cinema, television, and 
photographs were even considered anathema to Muslims.35 Female members wore long 
black dresses and covered their faces with veils. They were secluded from the men and 
were only allowed to have contact with males in the presence of their husbands or of 
mahrims, the close relatives whom they are not allowed to marry, hr short, their social 
interactions were highly restricted.36
The Ihya al-Sunnah believed that if every Muslim consistently followed the doctrine 
of the Salaf al-Salih in his or her daily life, society would automatically become Islamic. 
This, in turn, would change the face of the state.37 When that happened, for the Ihya al- 
Sunnah, there would no longer be any need to establish an Islamic state. Given its 
attitude, it was not surprising that the Ihya al-Sunnah did not see eye-to-eye with 
movements that sought to turn Indonesia into an official Islamic state, such as the 
Negara Islam Indonesia. Ja'far Umar Thalib also criticized the doctrine of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which advocated the revival of the Islamic caliphate, khilafa Isldmiyya. 
Ja'far Umar Thalib believed that such a goal would concentrate all Muslim minds and 
energies on political interests, and he contended that this principle had already caused 
bloody conflicts among Muslims.38
As far as the Ihya al-Sunnah community is concerned, the implementation of the 
sharf a by individuals, as described above, was thus much more important than the 
estabhshment of an Islamic state. Such a tendency is called by Olivier Roy 
"neofundamentalism," a movement that began to spread across the political landscape 
of the Muslim world in the mid-1980s. Its proliferation was caused partly by the 
failure of revolutionary Islamism, a modem Islamic political movement which claims to 
re-create a true Muslim society, not merely by the application of the shaft a, but also by 
creating a new Islamic order through revolutionary and militant political actions.39
The Halaqahs: Site of Recruitment of the Ihya al-Sunnah Cadres
The prime recruits targeted by the Ihya al-Sunnah da'wa movement were initially 
participants in the halaqahs, which have spread widely since the 1980s throughout
33 Cutting the beard is considered wicked, since such an act brings Muslims into invidious comparison with 
infidels. See Abu Nu'aim M. Faisal Jamil al-Madani, "Jenggot dalam Pandangan Islam," Salafy 7 (1996): 35- 
37.
34 Music and movies, for instance, were considered heretical entertainments that should be avoided; see 
"Jebakan-jebakan Iblis," Salafy 24 (1998): 24.
35 On their rejection of these things, see thefatwas of the Ahlu Sunnah published in Salafy.
36 See, for instance, Abu Zaki Fathur Rahman, "Hukum Berjabat Tangan dengan Wanita Bukan Mahram" 
and "Hukum Keluamya Seorang Wanita Memakai Minyak Wangi," Salafy 4 (1996): 6-7. These articles 
compile some fatwas of the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, 'Abd al-' Aziz ibn Baz, on the issues of women 
shaking hands with men and using perfume. Neither is allowed.
37 See Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Dakwah Salafiyah di Persimpangan Jalan," Salafy 1 (1995): 39-42.
38 See Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Fitnah Sururiyah Memecah Belah Umat," Salafy 2 (1996): 17.
39 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, p. 25.
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many campuses of "secular" universities in Indonesia, including Gadjah Mada, 
National Veteran, Diponegoro, Airlangga, Bandung Institute of Technology, Bogor 
Institute of Agriculture, and the University of Indonesia. These halaqahs were groups 
which insisted on the need for a moral revolution in order to confront the increasingly 
secularized, decadent world.40
The growth of the halaqahs can be studied against the background of the beginning 
of the 1970s, when Imaduddin Abdurrahim, who received personal support from 
Muhammad Natsir, introduced the program called Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (D a'w a 
Activist Training) at the Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology. 
Abdurrahim was a former secretary of the Islamic International Federation of Student 
Organizations (IIFSO), a Rabita-linked student organization.41 Specifically, this training 
program was aimed at training new cadres among university students prepared to 
conduct da'wa activities in the broader society.
There can be little doubt that the spirit and euphoria inspired by the success of the 
Iranian revolution in 1979 contributed a great deal to the expansion of the halaqahs at 
university campuses throughout Indonesia. This revolution provided not only 
inspiration, but also a blueprint for Muslims all over the world to struggle for the 
creation of Islamic states. In the years that followed, the Muslim world witnessed what 
John Esposito calls an "Islamic resurgence," marked by an increasing interest among 
Muslims in implementing religious teachings into various aspects of life.42
This current of Islamic resurgence coincided, at the national level, with a restrictive 
policy prohibiting university students from playing an active part in politics. This 
policy, known as the Normalization of Campus Policy (NKK, BKK), to a large extent 
closed public spheres at university campuses and limited the dynamics of student 
organizations. It was later strengthened by government enforcement of the Pancasila as 
the sole foundation (asas-tunggal) of all political and mass organizations. In these 
distressing and discouraging circumstances, the religious locus was one of the few 
remaining open spaces attractive to students.
The halaqahs were particularly appealing to students who came from either small 
towns or rural areas, or the urban lower-middle classes. Benefiting from the government 
program of mass education, which broadened the chances of the younger generation to 
receive a university education, they were able to continue their studies at different 
prestigious universities in the cities of Indonesia. In the cities, however, they were 
vulnerable to culture shock, as they were immediately granted access to the world of 
pleasure, luxury and consumption, but suffered conflict when they could not detach 
themselves from their rural roots. This problem was exacerbated by their anxiety about 
the future and job prospects. The government's program to recruit more university 
students led to student overpopulation, which inevitably created fierce competition for
40 See M. M. Billah, "Gerakan Kelompok Islam di Yogyakarta," in Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia, 
ed. Abdul Aziz, Imam Tholkhah, Soetarman (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989), pp. 293-295.
41 On the role played by Imaduddin Abdurrahim in the proliferation of halaqahs and his proximity to Natsir, 
see Asna Husin, Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of Dakwah: A Study ofDewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1988), p. 168.
42 John L. Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 17.
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jobs, since the number of university graduates entering the job market increased 
significantly.
In such an atmosphere, Ja'far Umar Thalib offered participants in the halaqahs 
what might be called an appropriate channel and new zeal, for he promised them the 
opportunity to create alternative communities that would provide them with more 
security in facing the future. As a result, many of these students, particularly from the 
universities in Yogyakarta and Central Java, soon became part of the Ihya al-Sunnah 
community.43 Interestingly, most of the students who joined the Ihya al-Sunnah 
community came from the scientific and technical disciplines, particularly from schools 
of medicine, forestry, engineering, mathematics, and tire natural sciences. The students 
in these disciplines were trained in the framework of mathematic formulas. They were 
very enthusiastic about Ja'far Umar Thalib's ideas, which they took literally. In 
addition, many students from such backgrounds experienced a kind of spiritual void 
and a "guilty feeling," given their fascination with the progress of the West in terms of 
science and technology. A desire to compensate for this fascination, which they saw as 
mistaken, impelled them to join the Ihya al-Sunnah and other similar groups.44 After 
graduating from the universities, many of those who had been involved in the Ihya al- 
Sunnah community enthusiastically maintained their engagement with Ja'far Umar 
Thalib and his brand of activism.
The FKAWJ: Organization and Membership
As I shall elaborate below, the major changes taking place in the socio-political and 
economic realms of Indonesia after the eruption of the multidimensional crisis in 1998 
likely stimulated the transformation of the Ihya al-Sunnah into the FKAWJ. This change 
also meant a shift in orientation: from the non-political da'wa into political activism.45 
When Ja'far Umar Thalib established the FKAWJ, the Ihya al-Sunnah membership 
immediately provided enthusiastic support. They served as the backbone of the 
organization, formulating and organizing various programs and actions of the FKAWJ. 
It was also from among them that Ja'far Umar Thalib recruited his best soldiers to fill 
the available positions in the FKAWJ organization.
Different from the Ihya al-Sunnah, which was an informal organization based on a 
shared interpretation of Islam, the FKAWJ is a formal, centralized organization, which 
enables Ja'far Umar Thalib to mobilize his followers for collective action. William 
Garrison's seminal study of collective action concludes that such highly centralized 
bureaucratic organizations are the most effective mechanisms for realizing success in
43 "Target Kami Menyingkirkan Gus Dur," Interview with Ja'far Umar Thalib, Panji Masyarakat 01, IV 
(April 26, 2000).
441 am grateful to M. Khalid Masud, who introduced me to this term and shared his perspective with me.
45 This shift into political activism caused conflict and fragmentation in Salafi society in Indonesia. Abu 
Nida, who played an important role in initiating the Salafi da'wa in Yogyakarta, prepared to oppose Ja'far 
Umar Thalib's FKAWJ. Similarly, Abu Faiz Asifuddin and Yazid Jawwas strongly criticized Ja'far Umar 
Thalib's political actions. Abu Nida has been occupied with his own group, Jama'ah Ihya al-Turath, while 
Abu Faiz and Jazid Jawwas established Jama'ah al-Sunnah and al-Sofwah, respectively.
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social movements because of the readily available sources of labor, efficient decision­
making structures, and a high degree of combat readiness.46
The FKAWJ has a relatively modem organizational structure. It has a central 
executive board, whose headquarters are located in Yogyakarta. This executive board 
is led by Ayib Safruddin, a young graduate of the psychology faculty at 
Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta. He is assisted by a secretary, M a'ruf Bahun, 
an engineer from Haluoleo University in Central Sulawesi. The executive board has a 
number of divisions, each of which is headed by a divisional leader. The majority of 
the divisional leaders are university graduates.47 This central executive board 
supervises provincial and district branches. Provincial branches have been established 
in twenty-four provinces of Indonesia. Each provincial branch has a number of district 
branches.
In the organization's hierarchy, an advisory body has authority over the central 
executive board; this advisory body is actually a supreme religious board led by Ja'far 
Umar Thalib. This advisory body is comprised of fifty-four young religious 
intellectuals, the majority of whom have been trained by Salafi-W ahhabi teachers or 
have studied at different universities in the Middle East, including King Muhammad 
Ibn Saud and Medina Islamic Universities. Each member of this board is responsible 
for giving religious lectures in different branches of the FKAWJ. Together with the 
university graduates who become the organizers of the FKAWJ, they constitute the 
movement's leaders, and are responsible for mobilizing all FKAWJ collective actions.
Most of the rank-and-file members of FKAWJ are low-income people, university 
students, and the unemployed. Most are young people from rural areas where FKAWJ 
branches have been established. Every branch of the FKAWJ organizes regular religious 
lectures, through which the Salafi-Wahhabi teachings are disseminated among the 
participants from the surrounding areas. In addition to this, the FKAWJ maintains 
twelve pesantrens throughout Indonesia. The chief task of these pesantrens is to educate 
orphans and neglected children who are old enough to go to school. In these pesantrens, 
such conventional subjects as Arabic, Islamic theology, Islamic jurisprudence, the 
theories of the Qur'an, and the hadith are taught. From these pesantrens, the student 
element in the FKAWJ masses is generally recruited. The total number of all FKAWJ 
members is estimated at approximately forty thousand people.48
In order to recruit new members and collect money from sympathizers, the Laskar 
Jihad has also set up "stands" near mosques, schools, traffic lights, and other public 
venues. Without hesitation or reluctance, they frequently address passers-by to tell 
them about the ferocity of Christian enemies. They also distribute the bulletin Maluku 
Hari Ini (The Moluccas Today), containing the Laskar Jihad version of the Moluccan
46 William A Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1975).
47 On the persons appointed as members of the executive board, see h ttp ://www.fkawj.org. In mid-2001, 
there were some small changes in the organizational structure of the FKAWJ and its personnel; see the same 
homepage.
48 Interview with Hardiyanto, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, November 3,2000; I am grateful to Muhammad 
Wildan, who helped me in conducting this interview.
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conflict in daily reports. They have insisted that they are ready to do anything to 
defend Islam, including sacrificing their own lives.49
Although there are a number of rumors associating the FKAWJ with military and 
civilian political personalities, the FKAWJ itself claims to be an independent 
organization. In an interview with the fortnightly Panji Masyarakat, the modernist 
Muslim Indonesian magazine, Ja'far Umar Thalib totally rejected all speculation about 
the involvement of either Wiranto (the former military chief and minister of defense), 
Fuad Bawazier (the former minister of finance, associated with the al-Irshad and 
known as having ties to the Suharto family), or any other political figures associated 
with Habibie in FKAWJ activities.50 In my interview, nevertheless, the representatives 
of the FKAWJ did not deny having received some financial and other support both 
from Indonesia and abroad, particularly Malaysia, Japan, and the Middle East.51
The FKAWJ's organizational symbol—two crossed swords with the words "La 
ilaha ilia Allah, Muhammad Rasul Allah" (There is no God but Allah and Muhammad 
is His messenger) printed on them—gives a clear indication of the militancy with which 
they are prepared to defend their beliefs. This militancy manifested itself on January 
30, 2000, with the establishment of the Laskar Jihad, a special military division within 
the FKAWJ. As soon as it was established, a command structure resembling that of the 
army was created: the Laskar Jihad consists of brigades, battalions, companies, 
platoons, and teams, and it even has its own intelligence service. Ja'far Umar Thalib 
himself was appointed commander-in-chief of the Laskar Jihad. He is assisted by a 
number of field commanders, including Ali Fauzi and Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari.
The Laskar Jihad itself has approximately ten thousand members. Of that number, 
by September 2000, there were around three thousand members who had been engaged 
in combat in the Moluccas.52 The number of the Laskar Jihad fighters involved in the 
Moluccan conflict has remained fairly constant, with new fighters coming to the islands 
to replace those returning home.
The M ultidim ensional Crisis: Turning Point of the Ihya al-Sunnah
As I have indicated, the transformation of the Ihya al-Sunnah into the FKAWJ 
occurred when a significant change took place in the political landscape of Indonesia, 
following the multidimensional crisis afflicting the country. This crisis not only acted as 
the catalyst that ultimately forced Suharto to resign from the presidency; it also 
stimulated the forging of free political space. The so-called Reformation Era has 
arrived, but, ironically, the living conditions of the people have steadily worsened. 
Many have lost their jobs, and with them their future security. These problems have
49 By December 2000, around twenty fighters of the Laskar Jihad had died in the Moluccas.
50 See "Target Kami," Panji Masyarakat 1, IV (April 26, 2000).
51 Interview with Hardiyanto, Campaka Putih Tengah, Jakarta, December 9,2000.
52 Interview with Ayib Safruddin, Sabili 7,VIII (September 20,2000).
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produced numerous demonstrations that have occasionally exploded into violence and 
riots.53
When Habibie was appointed Suharto's successor, he was faced not only with this 
multidimensional crisis, but also, and immediately, with strong opposition from 
different elements in society, particularly those supporting Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
who protested against Habibie persistently, demanding his resignation. At one point in 
time, Megawati's supporters threatened that, if Habibie were not prepared to step 
down at the extraordinary session of the MPR in November 1999, "People Power," a 
united front composed of leftist students and the Barisan Nasional (National Front), 
as well as other pro-Megawati groups, would force him out of office.
In reacting to this pressure, Habibie's supporters, mobilized by various Islamic 
organizations from the modernist end of the spectrum—including the Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (People United Party), the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, the 
Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia (the Islamic Boarding School 
Cooperative Council of Indonesia), the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam 
(Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity), and the Centre for Information 
and Development Studies—came out in force to stand behind Habibie.54 These 
organizations were supported by a number of influential figures, such as Hamzah Haz, 
Anwar Harjono, Hartono Mardjono, M. Kholil Ridwan, Ahmad Sumargono, Eggy 
Sudjana, Fadli Zon, and Adi Sasono, some of whom were well-known allies of 
Lieutenant General (ret.) Prabowo Subianto.55 Prabowo (son-in-law of Suharto) was 
dismissed from the army during Habibie's presidency for his alleged role in kidnapping 
some activists, and also for his role in the violent riots of March 13-14, 1998, which he 
is suspected of having triggered in an attempt to discredit popular opposition to 
Suharto and, at the same time, to force Wiranto, his strongest rival, into a com er.56
Following the pressure and protests against Habibie, rumors that a Christian-cum- 
Zionist plot or an evil communist alliance was working to undermine and seriously 
harm the most populous Muslim country in the world suddenly became more 
prevalent, inevitably shocking many people.57 Such rumors were believed to be 
produced by Ahmad Sumargono, Eggy Sujana, and Fadli Zon, all known for their 
prominence among regimist Muslims, in their efforts to seek an issue that might unite 
and mobilize Muslims against opposing forces.58
As the pressure against Habibie mounted, the Ihya al-Sunnah community became a 
participant in tire political discourse of the state. Its official publication, the monthly 
magazine Salafy, lost no time in publishing the Ihya al-Sunnah standpoint concerning
53 On the violence and riots following the crisis, see Cees van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesia betvxen 
1997 and 2000 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001), pp. 111-113.
54 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability, 2nd edition (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2000) pp. 349 and 368-369; see also van Dijk, A Country in Despair, pp. 332-333.
55 On the proximity of Prabowo and these figures, see "Mengapa Prabowo Mendekat," Sabili 4, VI 
(September 2,1998): 10-11.
56 See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), p. 206.
57 On these rumors, see Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 347-348.
58 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 207
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recent developments in the political realm. They condemned the practice of Western 
democracy and identified Zionist-cum-Christian and/or communist conspirators as 
the parties allegedly responsible for the spread of democratic and communist ideas in 
the country. In one of his articles, Ja'far Umar Thalib referred to democracy as an un- 
Islamic, troublesome institution visiting disaster upon Indonesia today. He is convinced 
that sovereignty does not belong to people; it belongs absolutely to Allah. Allah is the 
only sovereign who should be obeyed. There is no law except the law of God.59
The Apel Siaga (Call for Readiness) held by the FKAWJ in Solo in February 1999 
obviously reflected the growing anxiety of the FKAWJ about the political developments 
of the time. At this Apel Siaga, the FKAWJ warned Muslims not to fall into the trap set 
by their enemies. According to them, the best way to guard against such an eventuality 
was to support consistently an Islamic government led by a pious Muslim. The meeting 
also declared that Muslims were required to wage war against a government led by an 
infidel (seorang yang kafir),60 a declaration that called to mind the doctrine of takfir of 
Sayyid Qutb.61
As the general election of June 1999 approached, the rivalry between Habibie and 
Megawati gained momentum. In efforts to attack the other party, various issues 
exploiting ethnic, religious, and other primordial sentiments were raised by supporters 
of each party. One remarkable example was the case of Theo Syafei, a Roman Catholic 
who was an influential supporter of Megawati. He made a speech, a tape of which 
was widely circulated, about a plan by members of the political elite to transform 
Indonesia into an Islamic republic by the year 2010. Commenting on this proposal, he 
stated that Christian, rather than Islamic, notions had inspired and been the basis for 
Indonesia's penal code and human rights ideals, so that the role of Christians in the 
historical course of the Indonesian nation-state should not be neglected. This speech 
inspired harsh protests from a variety of Muslim organizations and individuals, 
particularly from the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian 
Committee for Islamic World Solidarity, KISDI) and the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
se-Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI), and many of these 
groups used it as a weapon against Megawati.62
In the thick of this rivalry, a merciless debate emerged over whether or not a woman 
could be president. As the leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), 
Megawati was a strong potential candidate to challenge Habibie, who was closely 
associated with Islam. For Megawati's supporters, the time had indeed come to stand 
behind her to win the election at all costs. Some pro-Megawati groups in Surabaya, for 
instance, stated their determination to die for Megawati, demonstrated by a petition 
signed in blood. In their counter-arguments, Habibie's supporters insisted that
59 Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Menyoal Demokrasi," Salafy 30 (1999): 4-5; see also "Suara Rakyat Tunduk pada 
Suara Tuhan," Suara Hidayatullah (July 1999): 1-6.
60 "Apel Siaga Umat Islam," Salafy 30 (1999): 44.
61 On the analysis of this doctrine and Sayyid Qutb's thoughts in general, see Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical 
Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University 
of Beirut, 1992).
62 See van Dijk, A Country in Despair, pp 380-381.
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defending Habibie necessarily meant defending Islam, and the Islamization of the state. 
Consequently, the campaigns of both sides resorted to aggressive tactics, even violence.
As part of the campaign to disqualify Megawati as a candidate, pictures of 
Megawati praying at a Balinese Hindu temple had appeared in Indonesian 
newspapers. Megawati's detractors immediately seized upon this image to suggest that 
she was a Hindu. A. M. Saefuddin, a Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Unity 
Development Party) minister in Habibie's cabinet, went even further, asking: are we 
ready to be led by a Hindu president? Infuriated by Saefuddin's insinuation, Balinese 
Hindus held a demonstration demanding that Habibie discharge Saefuddin from his 
cabinet.
Concerned about Megawati's candidacy, the Ihya al-Sunnah community asked 
Ibrahim ibn Amir al-Ruhaili, a Saudi Salafi mufti who was a lecturer at the Islamic 
University of Medina, about how they should react if she were elected. On the basis of 
the questions, afatxva (religious decree) was issued. This fatwa declared that:
To appoint a woman to be the leader of a Muslim state is disavowed [munkar]. 
We are not allowed to choose a Muslim woman to be the leader of Muslim men, 
just as we are not allowed to appoint a sinful man to be the leader. But if the 
woman has already been elected to be president, but then signs of her sinfulness 
emerge, we would not be allowed to resist against her. In principle, a woman 
cannot be appointed to be a leader. To appoint a woman as president is an act 
which contradicts the guidance of the Prophet.63
Islam ization Policy and the Resurfacing of Political Islam
The linkage between Habibie and his Muslim supporters can be traced back to the 
Islamization strategy established by Suharto's New Order in the last decade of its rule. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Suharto introduced an Islamization strategy, particularly 
focusing on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse and the 
accommodation of religious socio-political powers. In the context of this strategy, a 
number of organizations and institutions that made use of Islamic symbols have come 
to the fore. The Islamic Court Bill was introduced, followed by the presidential decree 
on the Compilation of Islamic Law. Islamic sharia banks and insurance companies 
sprang up everywhere, and thousands of mosques were built under the sponsorship of 
the state. Most importantly, the ICMI was established under Suharto's patronage, and 
Habibie, as a close associate of Suharto, was appointed the leader of the 
organization.64 At the same time, there was also a growth in popularity of the jilbab, an 
Islamic head covering for women, the hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca, and religious rituals 
and festivals.65 In the wake of the introduction of this conservative Islamization 
strategy, within a very short time, the state drastically moved away from its former 
secular position, and prominent Muslim figures emerged as actors in national politics.
63 "Sikap Umat Islam Bila Megawati Jadi Presiden," Salafy 33 (1999): 53-54.
64 Martin van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia," 
in Indonesien Am Ende Des 20. Jahrhunderts: Analyses zu 50 Jahren Umbhaengiger Entunckling, Deutsche in 
Indonesien, ed. Ingrid Wessel (Hamburg: Abera, 1996), pp. 48-49.
65 Ibid., p. 47.
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This Islamization strategy was believed by a number of scholars to be a way to 
contain the spread of the legitimacy crisis experienced by the New Order after more 
than twenty years of power.66 This crisis occurred partly because the state, while 
failing to fulfill the requirements of social welfare, was unwilling to provide sufficient 
space for all segments of society to express themselves and pursue their interests. In 
spite of the considerable role played by Muslims in founding and supporting the New 
Order, the expression of political Islam, for instance, had been marginalized throughout 
Suharto's tenure and even repressed by the authoritarian state.
Indeed, the marginalization of political Islam was responsible for a number of 
protests. Different Islamist uprisings labeled ekstrem kanan (extreme right), which 
demanded, for example, the application of the Jakarta Charter, had broken out since 
the end of the 1960s. Such protests were often followed by the damaging of Christian 
churches and the destruction of night clubs and gambling casinos.67 Islamist rebellion 
movements also emerged, like the Komando Jihad (Jihad Command), which advocated 
the establishment of an Islamic state. These movements were consistently and violently 
crushed by the state.68 In the face of the New Order repression, all attempts to protest 
and rebel were bound to end with failure, inevitably creating a feeling of deprivation 
and frustration among their constituency. This frustration reached its peak when the 
state successfully forced all socio-political organizations to accept the Pancasila as 
their sole foundation. Many were forced either to disguise their real "faces" or to move 
their activities underground.
The state-run Islamization project was supported by many Islamist groups, who, 
having lost hope, affiliated themselves with the project, or at least felt that they were 
going in that direction. Indeed, many groups saw this as a promising opportunity. 
Muslims who had been forced to remain on the periphery, or who had been given 
limited space in national politics, found a new way to enter the political, social, and 
economic arenas of the state. They believed that they would be able to change the fate 
of their society, their nation, and their state—not to mention bringing about changes at 
the personal level. In this sense, the strategy of the regime appeared to succeed in 
"subduing" a variety of Muslim opposition groups. Suddenly there emerged what 
Robert Hefner calls "regimist Islam ," which did not recoil from showing itself to be a 
real partner of the state.69 When Suharto's New Order was being severely challenged, 
not long before its collapse, the regimist Islamists strove to show their loyalty to the 
president and attempted to help him maintain his position by, among other tactics, 
spreading anti-Chinese rumors and the Zionist-cum-Christian conspiracy theory.
Nevertheless, the fall of Suharto was inevitable. By the time he left office, the 
optimism of the regimist Islamists that the Islamized direction of the state would be 
maintained was fading. Their only hope was that Habibie would be able to sustain this
66 See, e.g., Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and Ideology of Tolerance (London: 
Routledge, 1995).
67 See Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: 
Croom Helm, 1981), p. 203.
68 On these rebellions and the indications of the involvement of some intelligence agents in the rebellions, see 
van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam?," pp. 43-46.
69 See Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 128-143.
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strategy. However, the embattled Habibie could not do so. Pressured by various 
elements in Indonesian society, he accommodated the demand for a new general 
election in June 1999 and facilitated that election.
In this general election, the constituency of regimist Islam, scattered throughout such 
different parties as the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the Unity and 
Development Party), the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, the Crescent and Star Party), and 
the Golongan Karya (Golkar, Party of Functional Groups), demonstrated their support 
for Habibie. Nevertheless, this scarcely mounted a serious challenge to Megawati 
Sukarnoputri with her PDI-P; 35.7 million votes went to her party, making it the winner 
of the 1999 general election. However, partly because of the political maneuvers of the 
Poros Tengah (Middle Axis), a political alliance of Muslim parties led by Amin Rais, 
the election failed to give Megawati the presidency. Instead, it brought Abdurrahman 
Wahid to power.
Abdurrahman W ahid's accession to power was welcomed with euphoria by many, 
including Muslims. He was considered a leader who would be able to diminish the 
tensions between the supporters of Habibie and Megawati. Nevertheless, as a public 
figure who had often produced controversial statements and policies, Abdurrahman 
Wahid soon had to confront opposition from different elements in Indonesian society. 
During his efforts to restructure the military leadership, waves of protests against him 
mounted considerably and led to an opposition movement in parliament.
While protest and opposition escalated, the economic and social conditions in the 
nation worsened. The value of the rupiah dropped again. Manufacturers stopped 
producing and exporting products. International trust plummeted. The ethno-religious 
conflict in the Moluccas spun increasingly out of control and cost hundreds of lives. 
Observing these recent developments, Ja'far Umar Thalib argued that these problems 
were very much related to the performance of the government, the breakdown of socio­
cultural boundaries, the systematic condemnation of the Indonesian military, and the 
increase in security disturbances.70 As a consequence, the FKAWJ felt that there were 
sufficient grounds to demand Abdurrahman Wahid's resignation.
In addition, for the FKAWJ, Abdurrahman Wahid was believed to be indifferent to 
the fate of Muslims. From their perspective, Abdurrahman Wahid had failed to show 
strong support for Muslims and so had effectively collaborated with Israeli-Zionist and 
Christian powers and thus facilitated a communist resurgence. They cited the 
welcoming of an Israeli trade delegation, the proposal to revive the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, the widespread availability of leftist and communist-leaning books, and, 
most importantly, the increasing ethno-religious conflicts in the Moluccas and other 
areas in Indonesia as examples of Abdurrahman W ahid's intimacy with "the three 
main powers which are hostile to Muslims." On these grounds, Ja'far Umar Thalib 
came to the conclusion that Abdurrahman Wahid was al-sultan al-ja'ir (an unjust ruler), 
who should no longer be obeyed.71
70 Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Saatnya Mengobarkan Jihad," Salafy 34 (2000): 2.
71 "Target Kami," Panji Masyarakat 1,VI (April 26,2000).
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Jihad  in the M oluccas
As we have noted, in conjunction with the increasing ethno-religious conflicts in the 
Moluccan islands and other areas in the Indonesian archipelago, rumors about an evil 
conspiracy between the enemies of the Muslims working to undermine the power of 
Islam became more prevalent. The conflict in the Moluccas, in particular, was believed 
to be part of a Zionist-cum-Christian project, led by the Republik Maluku Selatan (the 
South Moluccan Republic, RMS), a separatist movement with headquarters located in 
the Netherlands.
According to the Laskar Jihad, the Zionist-cum-Christian international powers are 
working to damage the gloiy of Islam in Indonesia by fomenting the disintegration of 
the country and "Christianizing" Indonesian Muslims. The Moluccan islands are 
simply a "pilot project" in this larger effort, the success of which will determine their 
subsequent agenda. Laskar Jihad insists that jihad is the only solution to counter the 
evil efforts of the Zionist-cum-Christian conspiracy.72
The Moluccan conflict broke out at the beginning of 1999. Since its eruption, it has 
provided primarily stories of the defeat of Muslims on almost all fronts. A number of 
newspapers and magazines, such as the Sabili fortnightly magazine, with a circulation 
reaching more than seventy thousand, have covered such stories vigorously. Certainly, 
the anxiety and furious anger of many Indonesian Muslims were aroused, which 
resulted in an explosion of rallies and demonstrations demanding the government curb 
the violence.
In reacting to the deteriorating situation, Salafy published some fatwas about what 
the FKAWJ referred to as "the Moluccan war." There have been seven fatwas, issued by 
seven different muftis, concerning the hukm (legal position) of being engaged in the war 
in the islands. These fatwas were issued following the first massive demonstration of 
the Laskar Jihad, and emphasized the seriousness of the contacts the Laskar Jihad had 
made with their authoritative Saudi Salafi muftis before launching their actions.
In the opinion of 'Abd al-Muhsin al-'Abbad, a Medina Salafi mufti, traveling to the 
battlefield in the Moluccas to defend the Muslims in the islands is lawful (disyariatkan), 
provided that it is not harmful to Muslims themselves, and that Muslims are in a 
defensive position. Ahmad al-Najm, a member of the Saudi senior 'ulama committee, 
agreed with the necessity of waging jihad in Ambon and suggested that Muslims were 
obligated to help their oppressed brothers. But this mufti warned the Laskar Jihad 
fighters first to take the following steps: (1) to choose a representative who would meet 
the ruler, to advise and approach him; (2) if the ruler took their suggestions into 
consideration, he should be obeyed; (3) if the ruler rejected their suggestions, Muslims 
were allowed to rebel against him, as long as they had sufficient power.
More obviously, the engagement of Muslims in the Moluccan war was judged by 
Muqbil ibn Hadi al-W adi'i, a Salafi mufti in Yemen, to be an individual duty (fard 'ain) 
for Indonesian Muslims and to be a collective duty (fard kifaya) for Muslims outside 
Indonesia. Taking the same tone, Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, a Salafi mufti in Saudi
72 Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Jihad fi Sabil Allah: Solusi Problematika Bangsa dan Negara Indonesia," Salafy 34 
(2000): 33.
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Arabia, argued that the engagement of Muslims in the Moluccan war was a fard 'ain, 
since Muslims were being attacked by Christians.
The necessity of helping the Moluccan Muslims who were being attacked by their 
Christian enemies was also declared by Salih al-Suhaimi, a Salafi mufti in Medina. He 
stated that jihad is compulsory in troubled areas, providing Muslims have sufficient 
power to undertake it. The same point was argued by Wahid al-Jabiri, a Salafi mufti in 
Medina. He was of the opinion that to defend Muslims being attacked by their enemies 
is compulsory.
Finally, in his fatwd, Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, a Salafi mufti in Medina, 
confirmed the lawfulness of the three steps that the Laskar Jihad had taken before 
going to Ambon. He said these steps, including the tabligh akbar, the meeting with 
Abdurrahman Wahid, and the military training in Bogor, were lawful, and sufficient to 
legitimize jihad actions in the Moluccas. Abdurrahman W ahid's prohibition of jihad in 
Ambon was judged unlawful, and consequently there was no longer any need to obey 
him. Quoting a hadlth of the Prophet, he said, "It is not allowed to obey someone in 
committing disobedience of Allah."73
On the basis of these fat was, Ja'far Umar Thalib declared the Moluccan war a holy 
war against Christian enemies attacking Muslims. He emphasized that engagement in 
the war was a duty that should be fulfilled by Muslims in order to honor Allah's 
message.74 Quoting Ibn Taymiyyah, Ja'far Umar Thalib said, "Should our enemy attack 
Muslims, to confront the attack would be an obligation incumbent on the Muslims who 
are being attacked and it would be compulsory for other Muslims to help them ."75 
According to Ja'far Umar Thalib, this was obligatory, because since it had succumbed 
to the pressure from Zionist-cum-Christian international powers, the government did 
not have the ability or the power to end the war.76
After these fatwas had been distributed, the stories about martyrs that were 
meticulously recounted in a specific column in the Salafy magazine apparently began to 
resonate among Laskar Jihad loyalists. "The war in the Moluccas has provides a 
golden opportunity to become a martyr, who can look forward to being welcomed in 
heaven by angels," said one candidate of the Laskar Jihad volunteers. The Laskar Jihad 
fighters believe it is the time to conduct al-jihad al-akbar, the true Islamic jihad.77
Authorized by the fatwas, the "holy war" in the Moluccas has apparently become 
integrated into the international jihad movement, which demands the participation of 
the umma, Muslim community. The Laskar Jihad indeed portrays itself as being the 
defender and guardian of the umma, whose lives are in jeopardy, so long as the state 
does not have sufficient power and political will to protect them. In such a situation,
73 See "Fatwa Para Ulama tentang Jihad di Maluku," http://www.laskarjihad.or.id/risalah/fatwa; see 
also Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Menepis Rekayasa Fatwa Seputar Jihad di Maluku," Salafy 34 (2000): 6-9.
74 For a detailed discussion of the way the radical Islamists understand the term “jihad," see J. J. G. Jansen, 
Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), pp. 15-31.
75 "Fatwa Para Ulama tentang Jihad di Maluku," p. 7.
76 Ibid., p. 10.
77 Interview with members of the FKAWJ, Cempaka Putih Tengah, Jakarta, December 2000.
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jihad is believed to be the only way to rescue the umma, as practiced by the Prophet 
Muhammad when Muslims were defending themselves from the kafir harb (attacking 
infidels). "Muslims should wake up and wage jihad against the harb enemies 
threatening Muslim lives," stated one Laskar Jihad veteran, who had just returned from 
the Moluccas.78
The spirit and motivation for both defending the religion of Allah and reviving the 
glory of Islam are persistently pumped into the Laskar Jihad fighters. Motivated to 
obtain a reward from Allah, thousands of the Laskar Jihad fighters have left for the 
Moluccas; they claim to have travaled at their own expense. They insisted that they 
were not reluctant to sell their property, like motorcycles or domestic cows taken from 
their parents, to finance their travel to the islands. Upon their return from the jihad, 
those who survived narrate their heroic stories to audiences of prospective mujahidin 
and to reporters for various publications of the Laskar Jihad. Several dozen of them 
have been martyred in the islands.
The portrayal of this conflict as a war between Muslims and Christians entails the 
projection of the medieval Christian crusades into the present. The Laskar Jihad 
fighters indeed frequently associate the Moluccan war with a Proyek Kristenisasi Salib 
(Christianization Crusade Project). Such an association provides a valid reason to 
reject the incorporation of the World of Islam into the globalization process.
It is not surprising that, in this war, the integration between jihad and da'wa has 
been emphasized, jihad is portrayed as a form of Islamic propagation intended to 
build an ideal society, an alternative society free from Western cultural stains. It is part 
of propagation activities aimed at "giving a correct understanding of prescriptions 
covering 'aqida (faith), ibdda (rituals), and mu'amala (social life)."79 Working in close 
cooperation with local Muslims, Laskar Jihad fighters have also established dozens of 
health clinics, refugee camps, schools, and mosques. By integrating jihad with da'wa, 
the attempt to resist globalization has found a firmer basis, since the waging of war is 
only considered part of da'wa. Reordering society according to their own ideal 
model—which contrasts with the existing globalized world order—seems to be much 
more important to them.
Epilogue
As the demands for the implementation of the sharT a have become more fluently 
articulated across the country, Laskar Jihad fighters have attempted to prove that they 
are indeed ready to espouse sharT a. At the end of March 2001, the Laskar Jihad 
enforced a rajm sentence against one of its members, who committed rape in Ambon. 
He was stoned to death after being interrogated by a Laskar Jihad Shari'a Court led by 
Ja'far Umar Thalib. He admitted his crime and accepted his punishment without 
protest. Before the sentence was handed down to him, Ja'far Umar Thalib reminded all 
the people present in the court, "W hat we do will be regarded by Allah as sincerity in
78 Interview with Laskar Jihad fighters, Cempaka Putih Tengah, Jakarta, December 2000.
79 See http://www.laskarjihad.or.id.
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upholding the religion of Allah, because of which Allah will endow us with victory in 
our jihad."80
A month after the execution of this sentence, Ja'far Umar Thalib was arrested by 
the police. He was accused of the torture to death of one of his followers and of 
incitement to criminal violence. In reaction to this arrest, a number of Islamic 
organizations like the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, the Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, the Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Seluruh 
Indonesia, and the Perguruan Islam al-Syafi'iyyah (Al-Syafi'iyyah Islamic Institution of 
Learning), held a mass religious meeting in front of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia office in Jakarta to demand the release of Ja'far Umar Thalib. The meeting 
was also attended by the leaders of these organizations, including Hartono Mardjono, 
Hussein Umar, Kholil Ridwan, and Daud Rasyid, who stated their determination to 
defend Ja'far Umar Thalib.81 In conjunction with the demand for Ja'far Umar Thalib's 
release, the so-called Gerakan Anti Komunis (Anti-Communist Movement) conducted 
sweeps for leftist and communist-leaning books and burned them publicly. A few 
weeks later, Ja'far Umar Thalib was released by the police.
In July 2001, during an extraordinary session of the MPR, Megawati Sukarnoputri 
was installed as president, replacing Abdurrahman Wahid, and Hamzah Haz was 
elected as vice-president. The Laskar Jihad promptly reacted by organizing a tabligh 
akbar in Yogyakarta. Once again, they proclaimed their determination to continue jihad 
actions and send militia troops to troubled regions, particularly Poso, Central 
Sulawesi.82 A few days later, a delegation of the Laskar Jihad visited Hamzah H az's 
office to voice their rejection of a woman president, claiming that her appointment was 
a great sin committed by Indonesian Muslims. In addition, they stated the necessity of 
implementing the sharVa, as if they were demanding the fulfillment of a promise given 
by this PPP party leader. Reacting to this demand, Hamzah Haz asked them to behave 
in a manner that would display Islam as rahmatan li al-'dlamin (a blessing for the whole 
universe), and not to appeal continually to militancy and violence.83
Following the attacks on Afghanistan by the US and its allies—a response to the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in September 2001—a number 
of Indonesian Muslim hard-line groups held demonstrations in front of the US 
Embassy in Jakarta.84 They condemned the attack on Afghanistan and demanded that 
the Indonesian government sever diplomatic ties with the US. Interestingly, the Laskar 
Jihad did not involve themselves in the demonstrations. This absence was confirmed by 
a representative of the Laskar Jihad, who pointed out that demonstrations constitute a 
form of democratic expression totally forbidden by Salafi teaching. For the Laskar
80 "Laskar Jihad Tegakkan Hukum Allah: Rajam Anggotanya Yang Melakukan Zina," 
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Jihad, any person who participated in those demonstrations committed a sin.85 
Nevertheless, in a television interview the day before, Ja'far Umar Thalib stated that 
ten thousand fighters were prepared to wage jihad in Afghanistan. This threat seemed 
more real when he visited many FKAWJ branches to warn troops to be in readiness for 
such an action.86 Ja'far Umar Thalib even sent the following sarcastic message to the 
US: "W e would like to sorrow over the United States, you should learn from your own 
arrogance. For Muslims, we would like to congratulate you for the revenge upon terrors 
committed by the biggest terrorist nation in the world, the United States, on Muslim 
nations."87
It seems to me that jihad has become a common word, characterizing a variety of 
discourses in Indonesia. This word is usually combined with the language of otherness 
and anti-Westernism and communism, identified by Bruce B. Lawrence as the 
hallmarks of Islamic fundamentalism.88 Even though there are some signs of the 
proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, nobody knows to what extent it 
will influence the future course of file country. One thing is clear: the violence, to quote 
Roy, "is more a sign of weakness than the harbinger of a new wave of Islamic 
m ilitancy."89 Political Islam remains on the political periphery, and may never succeed 
in changing the strategic landscape of the Muslim world. It is worth noting that the 
militant Islamic groups we have discussed are essentially not supported by mainstream 
Indonesian Muslims. Generally, I am in accord with Azyumardi Azra, who asserts that 
"once Indonesia attains a new equilibrium in this painful transition, most—if not 
all—of these Muslim hard-line groups will lose momentum."90
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